Charles Goodhart, Rosa Lastra, (2018), “Potential threats to central bank independence”, VoxEU, 11 March
Some 30 years ago, New Zealand introduced an arrangement combining operational independence and inflation targetry for the central bank, a regime change that rapidly caught on in the next few years as best practice for central banks around the world. This column, taken from a recent VoxEU eBook, argues that central bank independence owed a great deal to the supporting conditions that enabled it to achieve such great success in its early years. Blurring of independence in the field of financial stability may raise questions for central banks’ independence in the future.
- Panicos Demetriades, (2018), «Failing banks, bail-ins, and central bank independence: Lessons from Cyprus», VOX, 21 February
- Den Haan, Wouter, Ellison, Martin, Ilzetzki, Ethan, McMahon, Michael , Reis, Ricardo, (2017), «The future of central bank independence: Results of the CFM–CEPR Survey», VoxEu, 10 January