Kopczuk, W., Marion, J., Muehlegger, E. and Slemrod, J., (2013), “Tax incidence in the presence of tax evasion”, VoxEU, 30 September.
Tax evasion and noncompliance reduces government revenue and exacerbates the problem of increasing debt. Standard economic theory predicts that the identity of the tax remitter shouldn’t affect outcomes – but this ignores the possibility of evasion. This column provides evidence that in the presence of evasion, both the amount of revenue collected and the incidence of burden are sensitive to the identity of the remitter. These results should inform future tax reform.
Relevant Posts
- Princen, S., Mourre, G., (2013), “The role of tax policy in times of fiscal consolidation”, European Economy, Economic Papers N.502.
- Osterloh, St., Heinemann, Fr., (2013), “The political economy of corporate tax harmonization — Why do European politicians (dis)like minimum tax rates?”, European Journal of Political Economy, Volume 29, pp. 18–37.
- Binder, D., (2013), “Countries with higher rates of taxation tend to have happier citizens”, European Politics and Policy Blog, 10 September.
- Mariniello, M., (2013), “Do European fines deter price fixing?”, VoxEU, 22 September.