Rustom M Irani, Rajkamal Iyer, Ralf Meisenzahl, José Luis Peydró, (2018), “The Rise of Shadow Banking: Evidence from Capital Regulation”, CEPR, May
We investigate the connections between bank capital regulation and the prevalence of lightly regulated nonbanks (shadow banks) in the U.S. corporate loan market. For identification, we exploit a supervisory credit register of syndicated loans, loan-time fixed-effects, and shocks to capital requirements arising from surprise features of the U.S. implementation of Basel III. We find that less-capitalized banks reduce loan retention and nonbanks step in, particularly among loans with higher capital requirements and at times when capital is scarce. This reallocation has important spillovers: loans funded by nonbanks with fragile liabilities experience greater sales and price volatility during the 2008 crisis.
- Franklin Allen, Itay Goldstein, Julapa Jagtiani, (2018), «The Interplay between Financial Regulations, Resilience, and Growth», CEPR, April
- Jihad Dagher,(2018), «Regulatory cycles: Revisiting the political economy of financial crises», Vox.eu, 22 March