Featherstone, Kevin, (2012), ‘Le choc de la nouvelle? Maastricht, dé jà vu and EMU reform’, Greek Political Science Review, Issue 39, May-November.
The Maastricht legacy casts a long shadow on current reform efforts to stabilize the Eurozone or, worse, avoid its break-up. The initial agreement was vulnerable on two fronts, the absence of economic governance and a lack of cross national-solidarity that would have supported burden-sharing the EMU. The sovereign debt crises in Greece, Ireland, and Portugal exposed the gaps and led to a reworking of the EMU set-up. This however was not a paradigmatic shift but a ‘lock-in’ to the Maastricht frame, consistent with the original provisions. Recalibrating and toughening up the rules was hardly a substitute for the absence of mutual support. With path dependence increasing the adjustment costs, ‘institutional reforms’ risk an iteration of financial crisis- in debt exposure and banking system viability.