Chortareas, Georgios, Mavrodimitrakis, Christos, (2016), «Strategic fiscal policies and leadership in a monetary union», European Journal of Political Economy, 30 Απριλίου
We consider the strategic interactions between fiscal and monetary policies in a monetary union when a fiscal authority enjoys a strategic advantage. In particular we depart from the standard literature on strategic interactions in monetary unions in that we solve a three-stage game, where the two national fiscal authorities do not play simultaneously. We find that there is always an incentive for the leader fiscal authority to play a three-stage game, which leaves the other fiscal authority worse off under demand shocks. This choice leads to more (less) volatile union-wide fiscal stance for demand (supply) shocks compared to the standard narrow-coordination case. This volatility is positively related to demand shocks’ asymmetries.
- laeys, Grégory, Darva, Zsolt, (2016), «How to reform EU fiscal rules», Bruegel, 12 Απριλίου
- Brendon, Charles, Corsetti, Giancarlo, (2016), «COEURE Survey: Fiscal and Monetary Policies after the Crises», Centre for Economic Policy Research, Ιανουάριος.