Foremny, D. Freier, R., Moessinger, Μ. D. & Yeter, Μ. (2014) “Overlapping Political Budget Cycles in the Legislative and the Executive“, Discussion Paper No. 14-099, Centre for European Economic Research, December.
Abstract
We advance the literature on political budget cycles by testing separately for cycles in expenditures for elections in the legislative and the executive. Using municipal data, we can separately identify these cycles and account for general year effects. For the executive branch, we show that it is important whether the incumbent re-runs. To account for the potential endogeneity associated with this decision, we apply a unique instrumental variables approach based on age and pension eligibility rules. We find sizable and significant effects in expenditures before council elections and before joint elections when the incumbent re-runs.
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- Pelkmans, J. & Renda, A. (2014) “Does EU regulation hinder or stimulate innovation?“, Regulatory Policy, CEPS Special Reports, 19 November.
- Van den Abeele, E. (2014) “The EU’s REFIT strategy: a new bureaukcracy in the service of competitiveness?“, European Trade Union Institute (ETUI), Working Paper 2014.05, October.
- Jordana, J. & Rosas, G. (2014) “Making regulatory agencies independent is not always a recipe for better decision-making“, LSE EUROPP, 16 October.