O’ Rourke, K., (2014), “Whither the Euro?”, IMF Publications, 28 Φεβρουαρίου. The euro area economy is in a terrible mess. In December 2013 euro area GDP was still 3 percent lower than in the first quarter of 2008, in stark contrast with the United States, where GDP was 6 percent higher. GDP was 8 percent below its precrisis level in Ireland, 9 percent below in Italy, and 12 percent below …Read More

Λιαργκόβας, Π., (2014): «Η Ευρώπη και η κρίση», Foreign Affairs: The Hellenic Edition, 26 Φεβρουαρίου. Το Ευρώ – το νέο, ενιαίο νόμισμα της Ευρώπης – αποτελεί την κορύφωση της ευρωπαϊκής οικονομικής ολοκλήρωσης. Η εισαγωγή του την 1η Ιανουαρίου 1999 σηματοδότησε την τελική φάση τής Οικονομικής και Νομισματικής Ένωσης (ΟΝΕ), μια διαδικασία τριών σταδίων που ξεκίνησε το 1990 καθώς τα μέλη τής Ε.Ε. προετοιμάζονταν για το 1992 και την ενιαία αγορά. …Read More

Pistor, K., (2014), “German Court decision: Legal authority and deep power implications”, VoxEU, 26 Φεβρουαρίου Who wields supreme power over the ECB? This column analyses the recent ruling by the German Constitutional Court that the ECB cannot act as lender of last resort. Although seemingly couched by the referral of this decision to the European Court of Justice, this is a bid for power and the return to the pre-crisis …Read More

Rocard, M., (2014), “Taming Europe’s Banks”, Project Syndicate, 25 Φεβρουαρίου. Last month, the European Commission unveiled its much-anticipated blueprint for banking reform, aimed at reining in risk-taking by the European Union’s largest banks. But the proposal has met significant resistance, with some warning that it would erode European banks’ competitiveness, and others arguing that it is inadequate to mitigate banking risks effectively. How this debate unfolds will have profound implications …Read More

Onado, M., (2014), “European banks: Between a rock (need of more capital) and a hard place (low profitability)”, VoxEU, 23 Φεβρουαρίου. The financial crisis has put to the forefront the long-debated issue of banks’ capital adequacy, showing that banks were much more fragile than they (and their regulators) pretended, also because they were allowed to push their leverage to levels much higher than any industrial company, or even a hedge …Read More