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Why The ‘Genuine EMU’ Will Not Be a Fiscal Union

Hacker, B., (2013), “Why The ‘Genuine EMU’ Will Not Be a Fiscal Union”, Social Europe Journal, 02 January.

Although the critics of the Maastricht Treaty, who called attention to the risks of monetary integration without fiscal and political integration, long went unheeded, the current crisis has reopened the debate on the structure of EMU. At least there is – and this is confirmed by the process concerning a ‘genuine’ EMU – a debate on the shortcomings of the architecture of the Monetary Union. Even five years ago it would have been unimaginable to read about demands for eurobonds, a common budget or a banking union in key EU papers. And even in the face of the disastrous consequences of austerity policy the always hesitant discussion of Europe’s social dimension is gathering momentum again.

The EMU crisis unexpectedly offers, in the face of the possible collapse of the common currency, an opportunity to deepen integration through a banking union, fiscal capacity, common debt management and a social union. It is clear that this would be accompanied by more common regulations, tightened controls and the transfer of national sovereignty to the supranational level. Equally, this path of further deepening can be pursued only if there is also the impetus of democratic legitimation with regard to the relevant decision-making. This is as clear in the first plans drawn up by the four presidents in June 2012 as in the revised version of December 2012 and the Commission’s Blueprint.

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