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Policy consequences of public income volatility

Robinson, James, Torvik, Ragnar, Verdier, Thierry, (2015), “Policy consequences of public income volatility”, Voxeu, 27 Ιουλίου

As the Eurozone continues to struggle to recover from the economic fallouts of the 2008 crisis, and with Greece on the edge of exiting the currency union, it hardly needs to be said that politics has played a significant role both in the creation of the original crisis and in impeding an optimal solution to it. Since the 1970s economists have understood that politically chosen policy is unlikely to be socially optimally. Indeed, incumbent politicians have an incentive to move policy away from what is socially desirable, either because the probability of losing power makes them discount the future too much (Alesina and Tabellini 1990), or because this allows them to manipulate their re-election probability in a favourable way (Aghion and Bolton 1990, Besley and Coate 1998, Robinson and Torvik 2005, Robinson and Verdier 2013).

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