Stefano Micossi, Ginevra Bruzzone, Miriam Cassella, (2016), “State aid, bail-in, and systemic financial stability in the EU”, Voxeu, 6 Ιουνίου
Following the financial crisis, the EU banking system is still plagued by widespread fragilities. This column considers the tools and legal provisions available to EU policymakers to address moral hazard and incentives encouraging excessive risk-taking by bankers. It argues that the new discipline of state aid and the restructuring of banks provide a solid framework towards these ends. However, the application of new rules should not lose sight of the aggregate policy needs of the banking system. The financial crisis of 2008-09 and the ensuing sovereign debt and banking crises within the Eurozone led national governments to underpin the balance sheets of several banks through extensive bailouts, at the expense of taxpayers. Public outrage over the enormous losses placed on taxpayers convinced policymakers and legislators across the Atlantic – under the auspices of the G20 and the Financial Stability Board – that bank shareholders and creditors should be called in to take losses and suffer the full consequences of reckless management through bail-in, before any public back-stop could come into play.
Σχετικές αναρτήσεις
- Micossi, Stefano, Bruzzone, Ginevra, Cassella,Miriam, (2016), “Fine-tuning the use of bail-in to promote a stronger EU financial system”, CEPS Special Report No. 136 / Απρίλιος 2016
- Fratzscher, Marcel, Rieth, Malte, (2015), “Monetary Policy, Bank Bailouts and the Sovereign-bank Risk Nexus in the Euro Area”, European Commission Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs, DISCUSSION PAPER 009, Σεπτέμβριος 2015