The invisible hand of the government: “Moral suasion” during the European sovereign debt crisis

Ongena, Steven, Popov, Alexander, Van Horen, Neeltje, (2016), “The invisible hand of the government: “Moral suasion” during the European sovereign debt crisis”, European Central Bank, Working papers 1937, Ιούλιος

Banks’ rapidly increasing balance sheet exposures to domestic sovereign debt during the euro area sovereign debt crisis led both academics and policy makers to speculate that this development was at least partly the result of domestic sovereigns putting pressure on some banks to extend material support to the government, a mechanism known as “moral suasion”.

Σχετικές Αναρτήσεις

• Broner, A. F., Erce, A., Martin, A. & Ventura, J. (2014) “Sovereign debt markets in turbulent times: A view of the European crisis”, VoxEU Organisation, 23 Ιουλίου.
• Horváth, Bálint, Huizinga, Harry, Ioannidou, Vasso, (2015), “European Banks’ Sovereign Debt Home Bias: Voluntary or Involuntary?”, Voxeu, 31 Ιουλίου